In this impressive volume, Gregory Alexander analyzes property in American legal thought as a dialectic between conceptions of commodity and propriety. As commodity, property's primary purpose is to enable individuals to satisfy their personal preferences. Law maximizes social wealth (and ultimately individual satisfaction) when it allows those preferences to be freely expressed in the marketplace. As propriety, property's primary purpose is "the material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social order" (p. 1). Property as propriety rejects the subjectivity of value undergirding property as commodity. For example, property as commodity privileges freedom of disposition and exchange to satisfy individual preferences. However, property as propriety "is always committed to some particular substantive view" (p. 3) from whose perspective property legitimately prohibits the satisfaction of preferences. Moreover, propriety and commodity cannot collapse into each other. A proprietarian defense of the social order resulting from unimpeded market transactions would have to provide a justification besides the mere increase in social wealth or satisfaction of individual preferences.
Alexander rightly appreciates that he is working with very broad conceptions that function largely as ideal types since "few, if any, American legal writers were consistently and exclusively committed to one or the other" (p. All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms independence necessary to allow citizens to practice virtuous self-gove Jefferson failed to reject property as commodity. He relied upon sym on primogeniture and entail as the civic republican program of proper instead of considering public restraints on freedom of disposition. upon market exchanges and donative transfers were necessary to p estate speculation and dynastic holdings from undermining propert role in securing ordinary citizens' economic independence.
Meanwhile Hamilton, although more responsible than any other before him for developing property as commodity, was also proprieta redefined virtue as consistent with, rather than opposed to, self-in environment where secure public debt securities functioned as capital, unleashing individual ambition, creativity, and innovation wou commercial elite whose virtue lay in talent and accomplishment. Fre feudal vestiges of English property law, which fostered hierarchic dependency and an aristocracy of wealth rather than talent, Hamilton cial meritocracy would, like Jefferson's agrarian republic, reward virt ently conceived-rather than wealth per se. From this overall perspective, the book dissects the visions of prop by exemplary legal thinkers during the ages of American property law as civic republican (1776-1800), commercial republican (1800-1860 (1870-1917) , and late modern . Each period's discussion b a prologue about its characteristic legal writing. The prologues provide the sources on which the book relies to trace evolving property discou does that discourse unambiguously translate into decisions on concre issues, but it sheds new light on how legal thinkers conceived the between those issues and normative conceptions of property. The book reader to subtle and original analyses of such luminaries as James Chipman Gray, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Morris Cohen and Robert L. illustrate important themes in lawyers' evolving property theory.
The explanatory framework provided by the dialectic between pro commodity, however, is more problematic than the book's compelling more particular property theories employed in exemplary works of le ship and in public debates over concrete property issues. The argumen stant danger of falling victim to the book's appreciation of the nuances torical texts because the categories appear so malleable that shifts w approach threaten to overwhelm the significance of affinities between an or commodificationist approaches. Alexander appreciates the pote lem. He characterizes the commodificationist approach as essentially 3), since very different property regimes may satisfy its criteria. Mea proprietarian approaches may reject values' subjectivity hardly mean agree on the values that property law ought to protect. Uncovering pr strands in lawyers' property theory emphasizes similarly between just such disparate policies as slavery, strict limitations on inheritance, pate its to married women's property rights, constitutional protection of welf ments, permission of spendthrift trusts, elimination of spendthrift t constitutional protection of vested rights, and narrow constitutional p vested rights.
Consequently, the historical significance of the opposition between ity and propriety is broader than its role in any particular theory or p Alexander offers his account to correct those who portray property role as protecting the market from democratic attempts to use propert of the proper social order. I propriety explains only the legitimate goals of property historical commitment to pr individual preference satisfac That American property law tating the market, however claim for the significance of modem, economic libertarian rejection of the historical dia tradition. As exemplars, Alex Lucas opinion, one of severa bund federal constitutional p not show that their views ar influence than those of prev theory and fear of majoritari of the market, for instance, explain how he forsakes pro market as rewarding entrepr book does not undertake to tional protection of propert cannot tell how Justice Field justified market outcomes p government, is importantl Alexander cannot make the Milton Friedman grounded h political freedom and not mer
Although not yet proved, impact upon property schola constitutional protection of p nineteenth and early twentie tially turns that wisdom on i property rights' protection break from proprietarian ide torical legitimacy. To prove t tify the boundary between p ception of property is empty markets, every attempt to us to rely, at least implicitly, on follow merely from the goa even fully commodified conc promoting particular propert ture from earlier visions.
Sharpening the distinction between commodity and propriety also requires comparing those descriptive categories with others rooted in historical changes within economic conceptions of property. The emptiness of the wholly commodified conception of property is an artifact of the marginalist revolution in economic thought and the transition from the classical to the neoclassical paradigm. The latter sharply distinguishes between allocation efficiency and wealth distribution. It concedes that efficiency analysis presupposes, but cannot itself justify, a distributional starting point defined by property entitlements. The neoclassical paradigm enables discourse about fully commodified property by abandoning any sen proper social order besides that suggested by maximization of wealth and in ual satisfaction. Still, it does so only by acknowledging its limits as a nor framework for evaluating property's distribution. The neoclassical paradigm resents a shift within economic thought away from the classical paradi which market outcomes were not merely efficient, but also just becaus rewarded people for the "true" commercial value of their labor. However, t no break from tradition in lawyers' borrowing ideas about property from ing economic paradigms. Lawyers whose economic assumptions requi choice between wealth creation, individual satisfaction, and the material tion for the social order could not have viewed the distributive conseque those assumptions as embodying concessions to propriety.
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether Alexander's demonstration th proprietarian conception of property is part of our historical discourse supp overt revival. Those who advocate a commodified view may properly und that their progenitors were partial proprietarians only by virtue of earlier e paradigms' limitations. Nonetheless, the book requires modem commodif ists to confront proprietarian discourse when considering their view's hi legitimacy. Reminded that earlier commodificationists considered property normative perspective that allocational efficiency alone cannot support, thei em counterparts should confront the limitations of their own perspective. today's lawyers who conceive of property as commodity are apt to forget o that claims about property's efficient allocation presuppose, rather than property's pre-existing distribution. Even if the book does not provoke lawyers to appreciate the limits of m economic analysis, it will have a profound effect. By asking whether Am have been content to conceive property as mere commodity, subjecting the al foundation for the proper social order to the agnosticism of the mark Commodity and Propriety establishes an important agenda for property sc ship. Moreover, by tracing the view that "the purpose of property is not to individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some prior nor vision of how society and the polity that governs it should be structured"
